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In judicial practice, if the amount of damages is reasonable or not directly affects 
the implementation of antitrust private litigation, and reflecting the degree of 
realization of the relief function of antitrust law. Compared to the United States, 
China's antitrust private litigation is not active enough, one of the reasons is that 
Chinese anti-monopoly civil damages system, especially design of the rules of 
determining the amount of civil damages is not perfect. The legislation is too principle 
to provide victims enough incentive and results expectation, so our country needs to 
establish an anti-monopoly damages rules system which encourage private litigation. 
The main body of this paper is divided into four chapters. 
The first chapter analyzes the value orientation of the rule of determining the 
amount of antitrust damages. This chapter analyzes the different characteristics of the 
design of the rules of determining the amount of civil damages under the different 
values and functions from the perspective of value choice and institutional function. 
Theoretically, in the case of antitrust private litigation is not active, the design of the 
rules for determining the amount of antitrust damages should be incentive-oriented, 
but also take into account the efficiency goals. 
The second chapter systematically analyzes the method of determining the 
amount of damages in foreign countries, and analyzes how to apply the rules of 
calculating the amount of antitrust damages in typical countries and regions. Logically 
speaking, the steps of determine the compensation are as follows: first determining 
the compensation principle and scope of compensation, which is determined by the 
offenders return or impaired loss as the standard, and what the loss can be 
compensated; second is to measure the damage, caused by the monopoly damage by 
the economic analysis method to determine, finally, determining the compensation 
ratio. This chapter will list the representative countries and regions of the legislative 
and judicial practice, analysis of the pros and cons of various countries to determine 
the pros and cons of the rule of antitrust civil damages. 















amount of civil damages in China. This chapter attempts to explain why the existing 
rules cannot play a role in encouraging private litigation. First of all, the 
anti-monopoly civil damages and the traditional civil law damages exist segment, so 
simply based on the traditional civil law to establish the antitrust damage 
compensation amount determination rules does not adapt to the needs of the reality; 
secondly, in judicial practice, the judge is lack of judicial professional. Thirdly, single 
compensation system cannot fill the damage caused by monopoly. 
The fourth chapter puts forward some suggestions for the establishment of a 
more perfect civil damage compensation amount determination rule in our country. 
This chapter discusses the status quo of China's legislation, judicial practice and the 
characteristics of the legal culture of the country, drawing on the advanced experience 
of foreign countries, and puts forward some suggestions for China's legislation. Our 
country should establish the rules of determining the amount of civil damages based 
on the anti-monopoly law, introduce the expert witness system, at the same time, 
through the introduction of statutory compensation system to restrain the discretion of 
the judge. The selective punitive damages system can not only play a role in 
encouraging the lawsuit, but also achieve the goal of efficiency. 
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的惩罚性赔偿，因此，三倍赔偿并不具有足够的威慑力。①而 Robert H. Lande（1993）
则认为考虑到原告所付出的诉讼成本，理论上的三倍赔偿实际上只相当于单倍赔
偿，对原告的补偿并不充分，要实现对反垄断制度的改革，提高损害赔偿水平至




的诟病。1999 年欧盟委员会发布《关于改革欧共体委员会条约第 81 条和第 82
条实施规则的白皮书》，自此，欧盟反垄断私人诉讼迅速发展。同时，欧盟反垄
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德国学者 Thorsten Mäger 和 Thomas B. Paul（2014）从经济学的视角出发，
探究了反垄断法的实施中，公共执行和私人诉讼之间的相互作用，重点分析了罚
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